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Individual labour productivities are often unobservable for firms when hiring 
new workers. Job protection may prevent firms ex post from using information 
about labour productivities. We show that a binding minimum wage introduced 
in the presence of job protection will lead to lower unemployment levels than 
predicted by the standard labour market model with heterogeneous labour and 
full information. 
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The minimum wage may be a costly redistributive tool when it causes unemployment among 
the least productive workers. Standard labour market theory provides clear-cut predictions 
that minimum wages above market-clearing levels cause unemployment. The empirical 
studies on the labour market effects of minimum wages are less unequivocal.
1 Overall, 
however, the empirical studies more or less confirm that minimum wages reduce employment 
although the estimates for the negative employment effects differ substantially. 
While there is a broad consensus that minimum wages are harmful, the impact of job 
protection on employment is largely inconclusive. For instance, even if job protection reduces 
the flexibility of firms, this disadvantage can be offset by lower wages. Both theoretical 
analysis and empirical studies indicate that measures of job protection are roughly neutral for 
employment.
2 
We analyse the interaction of these two policy measures in a setting where the one 
measure – the minimum wage – is harmful as in the standard labour market model, while the 
other measure – job protection – has no impact on aggregate employment. If the minimum 
wage legislation is accompanied by job protection, the complementary measure may alleviate 
the destructive effects of the minimum wage on employment. When employers cannot 
distinguish ex ante between high- and low-ability workers, they are not able to pay different 
wages. Once employers learn about the true productivities of their workers, they will adjust 
employment or wages accordingly, if there is no job protection. Job protection, however, 
makes such adjustments more difficult or even impossible for firms. If firms cannot make use 
of the information gathered after hiring a worker, they will alter their labour demand. In the 
presence of job protection, firms do not compare the marginal productivity of a low-ability 
worker with the minimum wage when hiring new workers. Rather, the firms compare the 
(higher) expected marginal productivity with the minimum wage. This change in the firms’ 
hiring pattern renders the minimum wage less harmful when complementary job protection 
                                                 
1 See Neumark and Wascher (2008) for a comprehensive survey on the labour market impact of minimum 
wages. 
2 This is the conclusion of e.g. Cahuc and Zylberberg’s (2004) chapter on employment protection that 
summarizes the theoretical and empirical findings from among others Lazear (1990), Bertola (1990), Nickell 
(1997), Elmeskov et al. (1998), OECD (1999), Addison and Teixeirea (2003). 
   1  measures are at work. The effect of a minimum wage is thus not only determined by the 
market structure (e.g., atomistic or monopsonistic) but also by additional government 
interventions in the labour market. A minimum wage, when combined with job protection 
measures, can be the higher the larger the share of high-ability workers is and the larger the 
productivity differences between low-ability and high-ability workers are. 
To develop the argument, we set up a simple model with two types of labour, which differ 
with respect to their abilities (or productivities). In general, firms do not know a worker’s 
productivity in a particular job ex ante and only learn about the worker’s productivity over 
time (see Jovanovic 1979). We model this feature similar to Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004) and 
Blumkin and Sadka (2005), who assume that prior to hiring, firms cannot observe the 
productivities of applicants but detect the productivity of the worker after hiring.
3 In the 
scenario without job protection, firms will observe individual abilities ex post and adjust 
wages accordingly. In the scenario with job protection, firms cannot discriminate ex post 
between ability types anymore and, therefore, have to pay a uniform wage. Thus, job 
protection prevents firms from exploiting information, which is gained after a newly hired 
worker has started to work in the firm. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the model and describe the 
equilibrium without job protection. Section 3 introduces the scenario with job protection. We 
compare the outcomes in the two scenarios with respect to employment in Section 4. Section 
5 concludes. 
2. A standard labour market model without job protection 
There are two types of workers, low- and high-ability workers, who are endowed with   and 
 efficiency units of labour ( ).Without loss of generality, we normalize both the total 
number of workers and the total number of firms to unity. The share of high-ability workers in 
l q
h q h l q q <
                                                 
3 Blumkin and Sadka (2005) analyse a labour market where workers ex ante can provide some costly signal 
about their individual productivities. In Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004), firms can learn from the employment 
status of applicants. As we are interested in the complementarity of minimum wages and job protection, we 
abstract from such strategies. 
   2  the population is given by h.
4   and   denote actual employment of low- and high-ability 




High- and low-ability workers are substitutes in the production process, where each firm 
produces according to   with  ) ( l h h L L q f  and . Different productivities are not due to 
differences in (observable) education but rather due to ex ante unobservable productivity 
differences such as ability, reliability or work morale. All firms behave competitively and take 
the output price   and the wage rates   and   for the low- and high-ability workers as 
given. Profit maximization yields the first-order conditions 
1 = p l w h w
0 ) ( ′ q f = − =
∂
π ∂
j j l h h
j
w q L L
L
+ l q      for  l h j , = , 
which define the labour demand for high- and low-ability workers. In equilibrium, all workers 
have to be paid at least the legal minimum wage b ( , b w ≥ j l h j , = ). Depending on the 
magnitude of the minimum wage, we can distinguish four cases. 
Case A (non-binding minimum wage): If the minimum wage is below 
, wages ( () l q ) ⋅ l h
full
s h ( q h q f b − ⋅ + ⋅ ′ ≡ 1 ) can fully adjust so that the wages reflect 
the productivity differences:  . Firms are indifferent whether to hire low-
ability or high-ability workers. In equilibrium, all workers will be employed and we have 
 and  h Lh = h Ll − =1 . This critical level  , above which a statutory minimum wage 
becomes binding, depends on the productivities of both low- and high-ability workers and 
their respective shares. Figure 1 depicts the outcome in the labour market with the share of 
high-ability workers h on the horizontal axis and the minimum wage b on the vertical axis. 
All points below the  -curve are characterized by full employment (area A), all points 
above are associated with unemployment. The  -curve is downward sloping, i.e. the 
critical minimum wage will be lower with a larger fraction h of high-ability workers. An 
increase in h reduces marginal productivity as more efficiency units of labour are 
employed. This leads to lower employment levels for a given wage. As the wage for the 
low-productivity workers cannot be adjusted downwards, they are the first to be laid off. 
                                                 
4 To focus on the impact of the minimum wage and job protection on the hiring decision of firms, we abstract 
from possible supply side effects by assuming fixed labour supply for each type of labour. 
   3  The following three cases consider binding minimum wages in the standard setting. 
Case B: If the minimum wage is slightly above  , unemployment occurs but affects 
low-ability workers only. The wages of the high-ability workers will fully adjust 
( ) so that the firms’ demand equals the supply of high-ability workers.
5 
Starting from  , unemployment among the low-ability types is increasing in b. The last 
low-ability worker is laid off when  ( ) l
] h [
s q f ⋅ ′ =
− 1
h h q ⋅ b . In the interval  ] ; [





employment amounts to: 















q q q l l l ⎠ ⎝
, (1) 
where   is obtained by inverting the firms’ optimality condition that marginal labour 




s b b b
− ≤ <
1  where high-ability workers are fully employed, but where low-ability 
workers face unemployment. 
Figure 1: Employment without job protection 
 
Case C: Above the 
] 1 [ h
s b
−
                                                
-curve, the minimum wage becomes so high that no low-ability 
worker will be employed. As long as the marginal productivity of the last high-ability 
 
5 Note that the wages of the high-ability workers are strictly proportional to the minimum wage.  
   4  worker is above the minimum wage, the minimum wage is not binding for high-ability 





s b q h q f b b
− − ≡ ⋅ ⋅ ′ ≤ <
1 1 , it pays to employ all high-ability workers but it is not 
profitable to hire any low-ability workers: 
  h Lh =  and  0 = l L . (2) 
In area C of Figure 1, a further increase in the minimum wage level does no additional 
harm. 
Case D: For 
] 1 [ h
s b
− ≥ b , even the high-ability workers face unemployment. The 













− 1 1 0  and  = l L . (3) 
Area D in Figure 1 contains all cases where the minimum wage becomes binding even for 
high-ability workers. 
3. Job protection 
Now we turn to the case with job protection. When employers can distinguish between high- 
and low-ability workers before hiring, job protection has no impact. Firms would pay 
differentiated wages and the analysis of the preceding section would continue to hold. 
When, however, employers cannot distinguish ex ante between high- and low-ability 
workers, they are not able to pay different wages. While they will adjust employment or 
wages when they learn about the true productivities of their workers if there is no job 
protection, they cannot make such adjustments in the presence of job protection. Employment 
protection laws prevent firms from firing workers whose productivity is below the wage paid. 
Furthermore, employers will not raise the wage for the high-ability workers whose 
productivity exceeds the wage rate as long as these high-ability workers cannot signal their 
true productivity to other potential employers in the market. This creates an environment with 
hidden information for the firms at the hiring stage. All firms decide simultaneously on the 
   5  size of their workforce.
6 From the point of view of an individual firm, the distribution of 
productivities follows a binomial distribution. As we are interested in the impact of pooling 
heterogeneous workers and not so much in the stochastic process itself, we facilitate the 
analysis by assuming that each firm is sufficiently large and could hire a share h of high-
ability workers for sure. The average productivity amounts to  ) 1 ( h q h q q l h a − + =  and the 
representative firm maximizes  wL L q f a − = π ) (  with respect to employment. The first-order 
condition immediately yields the labour demand  ( ) a q a / q w f L
1 − ′ = . 
In the presence of job protection we can distinguish two cases. 
Case I (non-binding minimum wage): A wage below the average productivity will ensure 
full employment. The maximum non-binding minimum wage that just ensures full 
employment ( ) with job protection is  1 = L a a a q q f b ) ( ′ ≡ .  
Case II (binding minimum wage): For   firms will hire fewer workers and 
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The level of the critical minimum wage   depends on the share of high-ability workers and 
the productivity differences between low-ability and high-ability workers. 
Proposition 1. With hidden information, raising the share of high-ability workers h or 
the productivity   allows the government to raise the minimum wage without harming 
employment, if . 
Proof. Taking the derivative of   with respect to h and  a b  , we immediately obtain 
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6 This simplifying assumption is in contrast to models of job search where a stock of workers is only gradually 
replaced by new hires. Our setting is equivalent to an immediate switch to the new steady state. 
   6  For , an increase in h or   raises the expected marginal productivity.
7 This effect is not 
outweighed by the increase in efficiency units of labour so that the firms will hire more 
workers if h or   increases. This is in contrast to the scenario without job protection, where 
an increase in both h or   always reduces the marginal productivity of the low-ability 
workers. 
4. Comparing employment levels 
Do minimum wages generate the same unemployment patterns in the two scenarios? The 
comparison of the critical levels where the minimum wage becomes binding immediately 
yields  
Proposition 2. The level, at which the minimum wage becomes binding with job 
protection, always exceeds the respective level without job protection. 
( Proof. The critical levels are  a a a q ) q ( f b ⋅ ′ =  and  ) l l h
full
s q ) h ( q h q f b ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ ′ ≡ 1 . As we 
focus on full employment, we have  ( ) ( ) ) h ( q h l h q f q f a ⋅ ′ = ′ + ⋅ − 1 . Hence, the comparison of the 
critical levels yields 
full
s b ⋅ l a q q > l q
                                                
a a q b = . As  , the critical minimum wage is always higher 
with job protection. 
It follows from Proposition 2 that, if the minimum wage does not cause unemployment 
without job protection, it will never cause unemployment with job protection. If the minimum 
wage is so low that it does not even prevent the employment of the last low-ability worker, it 
also cannot distort the allocation of labour with job protection. 
If the minimum wage is between the marginal productivity of the last low-ability worker 
and the expected marginal productivity at full employment, firms have no incentive to hire all 
low-ability workers in the scenario without job protection but would still hire all workers 
when all workers have to be paid the same wage (with job protection). This is summarized in 
the following corollary: 
 
7 This condition is satisfied, e.g., for the Cobb-Douglas production technology. 
   7  Corollary. Any minimum wage that is between the marginal productivity of the low-
ability worker and the expected marginal productivity at full employment is binding in 
the absence of job protection, while it is non-binding in the presence of job protection. 
In Figure 2, we add the  -curve to the lines introduced in Figure 1. a b
8 For minimum wages 
below the  -curve, we have full employment with job protection. Therefore, employment is 
at least as high as without job protection. As we observe unemployment in the scenario 
without job protection for 
a b
, the area above the  -curve and below the  -curve 
indicates the combinations of h and b where the minimum wage is fully neutralized by job 
protection while causing unemployment without job protection. 
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A standard argument as to why the minimum wage may not be as harmful refers to 
monopsonistic structures in the labour market [Manning (2003)]. Proposition 2 and the 
Corollary provide an additional argument: job protection has a softening effect on the 
detrimental impact of minimum wages in otherwise functioning labour markets because firms 
                                                 
8 Figure 2 is drawn for the case  0 > ′ + ′ ′ ) q ( f q ) q ( f a a a . In the alternative case, the  –curve is downward 
sloping; see Proposition 1. 
   8  focus on expected marginal productivity rather than the lower marginal productivity of the 
low-ability type.  
Proposition 2 and the Corollary describe the outcomes in the area below the  -curve, 
where job protection is always beneficial as a complementary measure in terms of 
employment. Is job protection also helpful with a higher minimum wage that causes 
unemployment in the presence of job protection? We can formulate  
a b
Proposition 3. If the minimum wage is low enough to allow the employment of some 
low-ability workers in the absence of job protection, introducing job protection will 
always increase employment. 
Proof. All low-ability workers will be unemployed, when the minimum wage reaches . 
Employment with and without job protection are implicitly given by   
and  . As  , we get  . 
As long as the minimum wage is below the  -curve, there is still some employment of low- 
ability workers even without job protection. Proposition 3 demonstrates that in all cases below 
the  -curve, employment can be increased by introducing job protection. Finally, we are 
interested in the question whether employment with job protection can ever fall below the 
employment level without job protection.  
Proposition 4. (a) For  ( ) 0 ) ( > ′ + ′ ′ x f x x f : There is a critical level for the minimum 
wage above which employment is lower with additional measures of job protection. (b) 
For  : The minimum wage will always be less harmful with job 
protection. 
() 0 < ′ + ′ ′ x f x ) x ( f
Proof. (a) We show that there is a critical minimum wage  , where employment with 
job protection falls below the level without job protection. For such a minimum wage, 
employment is constant at   without job protection. With job protection, employment 
decreases in b in this interval At  , employment is higher with job protection:   
(see Proposition 3). At  , the employment levels are implicitly given by 
() s a a a b q L q ' f = ⋅ ⋅ ()  and   with and without job protection. Implicit differentiation  s h h b q h q ' f = ⋅ ⋅
   9  of  () s i i i b q L q ' f = ⋅ ⋅  yields   with i=h, a. 
For  , higher productivity goes along with higher employment  () 0 ) ( > ′ + ′ ′ x f x x f . As 
, employment is lower with job protection ( ) at  . Hence, there must be 
one critical minimum wage , above which job protection becomes detrimental for 
employment. (b) A critical minimum wage  , above which job protection becomes 






q ' f ⋅ = = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ′ . As higher productivity goes 
along with lower employment:   for  ( ) 0 < ′ + ′ ′ x f x ) x ( f , there cannot exist any 
employment level   satisfying the condition above. Hence, employment is always higher with 
job protection ( ). 
a L s L = Proposition 4(a) is illustrated in Figure 2. The  -curve, on which employment levels are 
the same in both scenarios, must be above the 
] h − 1 [
s b -curve and below the 
] 1 [ h
s b
− -curve. Below 
the  -curve, employment is always larger with job protection. For high minimum 
wages above the  -curve, the minimum wage is more harmful in the scenario with job 
protection.
a L = s L
a s L L =
9 For moderate minimum wages, which only affect the low-ability workers, job 
protection renders a statutory minimum wage less harmful. Only with high minimum wages, 
the economy may achieve higher employment levels when firms can operate without job 
protection. Thus, the negative employment effects of a minimum wage can be alleviated in 
the presence of complementary regulatory measures such as job protection. 
5. Conclusion 
The standard economic analysis stresses that a minimum wage above the full employment 
wage for low-ability workers causes unemployment. Our analysis has shown that this may not 
be true in the presence of complementary regulatory measures such as job protection. When 
firms cannot exploit information on workers’ productivities ex post, they are forced to focus 
on average rather than marginal productivities when hiring workers. A statutory minimum 
wage below the average productivity at full employment allows the government to raise the 
wage of low-ability workers without distorting the labour market. High minimum wages, 
                                                 
9 Along the  -curve, output is higher without job protection because only high-ability workers are 
employed. The iso-output line is below the  -curve. 
   10    11 
however, also cause unemployment with job protection. Eventually, the existence of 
complementary policy measures becomes detrimental. 
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